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We put forward a hybrid quantum key distribution protocol based on coherent states, Gaussian modulation, and
photon-number-resolving (PNR) detectors, and show that it may enhance the secret key generation rate (KGR)
compared to homodyne-based schemes. Improvement in the KGR may be traced back to the dependence of the
two-dimensional discrete output variable on both the input quadratures, thus overcoming the limitations of the
original protocol. When reverse reconciliation is considered, the scheme based on PNR detectors outperforms
the homodyne one both for individual and collective attacks. In the presence of direct reconciliation, the PNR
strategy is still the best one against individual attacks, but for the collective ones the homodyne-based scheme is
still to be preferred as the channel transmissivity decreases.
DOI: 10.1103/PhysRevA.98.012333
I. INTRODUCTION
In the last decade, continuous-variable quantum key distri-
bution (QKD) based on coherent states and homodyne detec-
tion (HD-QKD) gained much attention in the cryptographic
community [1]. In particular, the compatibility with telecom
techniques and the high detection efficiency makes HD-QKD
of interest for practical implementations [2]. Moreover, the
recent advances in establishing continuous-variable ground-
satellite quantum channels [3,4] exploiting coherent states and
homodyne detection has opened the way to the possibility
of a global QKD network. Heterodyne-based protocols have
been also suggested [5], and the secret key rate valid against
individual attacks has been analyzed [6,7].
Usually, in HD-QKD an observable with a continuous
spectrum is used to encode the information which will be
used to extract the secret key. For example, in the original
continuous-variable (CV) protocol based on coherent states
[8,9], the information is encoded by Gaussian modulation of
phase and amplitude of an input coherent state, whereas the
secret key is retrieved by a slicing protocol processing the data
from a homodyne detector.
Here we consider a CV-QKD protocol based on coherent
states, but we substitute the homodyne detector with a scheme
based on photon-number-resolving (PNR) detectors. While in
a typical homodyne detection one measures the difference
photocurrent from a couple of pin photodiodes [10] able to
detect a macroscopic photocurrent proportional to the number
of photons, here we consider a scenario in which the number
of photons is measured at the two detectors. Recent theoretical
[11,12] and experimental results [13,14] have shown that de-
tection schemes aimed to measure the photon number statistics
can be exploited in order to obtain some useful information
about the field quadratures. Motivated by these results, we
investigate whether, and to which extent, these PNR detection
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schemes can be employed in QKD protocols. Throughout the
paper we will refer to this kind of protocol as PNR-QKD.
More in detail, we will address the mutual information between
sender, receiver, and eavesdropper, as a figure of merit to assess
the performance of the PNR-based protocols [15].
The paper is structured as follows. In Sec. II we review
the principles of the HD-QKD based on coherent states and
evaluate the mutual information between sender and receiver,
and between sender and eavesdropper, in order to assess the
maximum key generation rate (KGR) [15]. Then, Sec. III
illustrates our novel PNR-QKD: we show that the presence
of two PNR detectors allows us to extract more information
about the detected signals. In our analysis we consider the
couple of numbers corresponding to the detected photons as a
two-dimensional statistical variable. We find that there exists a
threshold value on the LO energy above which PNR-QKD
outperforms HD-QKD. In this regime, we investigate the
performance of the PNR-QKD with respect to HD-QKD in
the presence of individual and collective attacks and for direct
and reverse reconciliation. Section IV closes the paper with
some concluding remarks.
II. HD-QKD WITH COHERENT STATES
In HD-QKD (top panel of Fig. 1), Alice, the sender, draws
two random real numbers, x and y, from a normal distribution
Nμ,σ 2 (z), with mean valueμ = 0 and varianceσ 2 = 2. Then,
Alice prepares the coherent state |α〉 = |x + iy〉, which is sent
to Bob through a quantum channel. The receiver, Bob, performs
homodyne detection by mixing the signal at a balanced beam
splitter (BS) with a local oscillator (LO), i.e., a highly excited
coherent state. Upon setting the LO phase at either φ = 0 or
φ = π/2, Bob can detect the quadratures xˆ or yˆ, respectively.
In order to distribute a secret key, Bob chooses randomly
to measure either one quadrature or the other on the signal
received from Alice. After repeating this procedure several
times, the partners share a string of (real) random variables
whose correlations are quantified by the mutual information
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FIG. 1. (Top) Scheme of homodyne-detection-based QKD (HD-
QKD). (Bottom) Scheme of PNR-based QKD, in which the two PNR
detectors are used together with a low-intensity LO. The parameter η
refers to the overall channel transmissivity. See the text for details.
I (A; B ), where A and B are the random variables of Alice
and Bob, respectively, with joint distribution PAB (a, b) and
marginal distributions PA(a) and PB (b).
In the ideal case of lossless channel, we have [8]
I (A; B ) = H (A; B ) − H (A|B ) − H (B|A), (1)
= 12 log2(1 + 42), (2)
where H (A; B ) is the joint (Shannon) entropy, and H (A|B )
and H (B|A) are the conditional entropies of A and B.
Losses, including the quantum efficiency of the detectors,
can be described by an overall channel transmissivity η, 0 
η  1 (see Fig. 1). In this case, the mutual information between
the parties is unavoidably reduced and becomes
I (A; B ) = 12 log2(1 + 4η2). (3)
Starting from their shared correlated variables, Alice and Bob
may distill a secret shared key using reconciliation [16] and
privacy amplification [17], both making use of a classical
channel. The presence of losses allows an eavesdropper, Eve,
to obtain some information about Alice’s random variable
without being detected, upon hiding herself within the channel
loss. In this case, the amount of information is limited by the
no-cloning theorem [18,19]. More in details, the reconciliation
stage requires a flow of information from Alice to Bob (direct
reconciliation, DR) or vice versa (reverse reconciliation, RR) in
order to correct the transmission errors and agree on a common
bit string, which is thus partially known by the eavesdropper.
In the first case (DR), Alice’s data form the secret key, and
therefore it is important to evaluate the information shared
between Alice and Eve. In RR, the secret key is instead based
on Bob’s data and the information shared between Bob and Eve
becomes the relevant player. The evaluation of the information
shared between the parties requires one to understand also
what is the kind of measurement performed. Here we focus on
individual attacks (each pulse signal is measured individually)
and collective attacks (the measurement involves all the sent
pulses) [20]. In the following we assume that Eve also uses
homodyne detection. This is a standard, feasible technique
which mimics the detection system used by Bob but with
a strong LO and pin photodiodes without photon-number
resolving capabilities. (For a more general discussion on the
optimality of Gaussian attacks, see Refs. [21] and [22].)
In the presence of individual attacks, the information shared
by Eve and Alice is quantified by the corresponding mutual in-
formation I (A; E) = 12 log2 [1 + 4(1 − η)2]. Assuming DR,
the secret KGR is given by [15]
I
(ind)
D = I (A; B ) − I (A; E) , (4)
which is valid for any QKD scheme where classical communi-
cation is permitted. In particular, upon running the homodyne-
based protocol proposed in Ref. [8], we have
I
(ind)
D =
1
2
log2
[
1 + 4η2
1 + 4(1 − η)2
]
, (5)
which is positive if η > 0.5, that is, the overall losses should
be less than 3 dB. This limit can be beaten using RR, obtaining
the following KGR:
I
(ind)
R = I (A; B ) − I (E; B ), (6)
= 1
2
log2
[
1 + 42
1 + 4(1 − η)2
]
. (7)
When Eve can perform collective measurements (but Bob
does not), we replace I (A; E) and I (B; E) with the Holevo
information [23] in the previous formulas. The analytical
results are quite cumbersome, but they can be obtained
straightforwardly given the state of Eve conditioned to Bob’s
measurement outcome [24], as we will describe in the next
section (see also Ref. [25] for further details).
III. PNR-QKD WITH COHERENT STATES
In this section we focus on the use of detectors able to dis-
criminate the number of photons in order to investigate whether
the KGR can be improved [1]. As we will see in the following,
this provides additional information at the output which may
be used to improve the secret KGR. In our scheme, the two
photodiodes usually employed to build homodyne detection in
HD-QKD are replaced by two PNR detectors. Furthermore, the
high-intensity LO needed to implement homodyne detection is
replaced with a relatively low-intensity (up to tens of photons)
one, |βeiφ〉 with β ∈ R (see the bottom panel of Fig. 1).
In order to evaluate the statistics at the output, we recall
that the output state of a balanced BS fed by coherent states is
factorized, namelyUBS|α〉|βeiφ〉 = |(α + βeiφ )/
√
2〉|(βeiφ −
α)/√2〉, α = x + iy. The photon statistics measured by the
two PNR detectors at the BS outputs are thus given by two
Poisson distributions,
Pk (n; μk ) = e−μkμnk/n!, (k = 1, 2), (8)
where the average numbers of photocounts μk ≡
μk (x, y, β, φ, η) read (we take into account the presence of
the losses)
μ1 = η(x
2 + y2) + β2
2
+ √ηβ(x cos φ + y sin φ), (9a)
μ2 = η(x
2 + y2) + β2
2
− √ηβ(x cos φ + y sin φ ). (9b)
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FIG. 2. Mutual information IAB = I (X; L) for a lossless channel
as a function of β and for different values of 2: from bottom to top
2 = 1, 2, and 3. The red solid line refers to PNR-QKD and the blue
dashed one to HD-QKD (the latter is independent of β). Notice the
presence of a threshold of LO amplitude β above which PNR-QKD
outperforms HD-QKD.
It is worth noting that, since Eqs. (9) depend on both x and
p, the PNR-QKD scheme may exploit the whole of Alice’s
input random variables X = (X, Y ), while, using homodyne
detection, the information about one of them is traced out at
each run, due to Bob’s measurement choice [8].
To investigate the performance of PNR-QKD with re-
spect to the homodyne-based scheme, we consider the two-
dimensional statistical variable corresponding to the two num-
bers of detected photons, namely, the two-dimensional discrete
random variable L = (N,M ), N,M > 0. The two variables
N and M are distributed according to the Poisson distributions
mentioned above. The joint distribution of the detected photons
n and m is thus given by
PXL(x, y; n,m) =N0,2 (x)N0,2 (y)P1(n,μ1)P2(m,μ2).
(10)
Starting from the joint distribution, we can calculate the two
marginals and evaluate the mutual information
I (X; L) = H (X, L) − H (X|L) − H (L|X). (11)
Without loss of generality, we set φ = 0. The mutual
information for an ideal channel, with neither eavesdroppers
nor losses, i.e., η = 1, is reported in Fig. 2 as a function of β.
We see that there is a threshold on the value of β above which
the mutual information I (X; L) for the PNR-QKD protocol is
larger than the corresponding quantity for the HD-QKD.
Figure 3 shows the threshold βth as a function of 2. The
monotone decreasing behavior of βth can be understood as
follows. If 2 increases, we are “feeding” both the random
variables X and Y in the PNR-QKD scheme, while only one
of them in HD-QKD, i.e., we are accentuating the convenience
of PNR-QKD with respect to HD-QKD.
A. Individual attacks
Let us now discuss the key generation rate in the presence
of losses and of an eavesdropper, Eve, in the framework of
individual attacks. In this case Eve performs a measurement
FIG. 3. Plot of the threshold value βth as a function of 2. For
β  βth, PNR-QKD outperforms HD-QKD.
in the same way on each state sent by Alice before the
reconciliation stage and the key generation rate is given by
Eq. (4) [20]. As we have seen above, the PNR-QKD protocol
based on PNR is providing more information about the input
alphabet compared to the homodyne case. Therefore, since we
have to consider the best strategy for the eavesdropper, we
assume that Eve employs the PNR scheme, if available. This
leads us to compare two scenarios, the one in which both Bob
and Eve employ homodyne detection and the one in which
they both use PNR detectors. The mixed case, where Bob
uses homodyne detection and Eve PNR one, has no practical
meaning, since during the reconciliation protocol Alice and
Bob will deal only with one random variable (say X) and
thus Eve’s information about the other random variable Y
is completely irrelevant. This also means that Eve cannot
use PNR detection in order to break the original homodyne
protocol [8].
In Fig. 4 we show the key generation rate I (ind) as a
function of the channel transmission η for HD-QKD and
PNR-QKD in the case of DR (solid lines) and RR (dashed
FIG. 4. KGR I (ind) as a function of channel transmissivity η
in the presence of individual attacks for HD-QKD (green) or PNR-
QKD (red), referring to the scenarios in which both Bob and Eve
employ homodyne detection and the one in which they both use PNR
detectors, respectively. We set β = 2 and 2 = 2. In this case PNR-
QKD outperforms HD-QKD in both cases of DR and RR.
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lines): PNR-QKD turns out to be the best strategy in the
presence of individual attacks. The enhancement may be traced
back to the dependence of the output variable L on both the
full Alice’s alphabet X and not only on one of the components
(either x or y), as it unavoidably happens for the original
homodyne protocol. Since Bob’s measurement is symmetric
with respect to Eve’s, the threshold η = 0.5 does not depend
on 2.
B. Collective attacks
To perform collective attacks Eve should store each quan-
tum state sent by Alice and measure it only after the classical
key distillation procedure. Now Eve can implement an optimal
measurement, and therefore the new figure of merit for the
KGR and DR is given by (as mentioned above, for a fair
comparison with the PNR-QKD we assume that Bob does not
perform a collective measurement) [20],
I
(coll)
D = I (X; L) − χ (A; E), (12)
where χ (A; E) = S[ρE] −
∑
x p(x) S[ρE|x] is the Holevo in-
formation between Alice and Eve. With S[ρ] = −Tr[ρ log2 ρ]
being the von Neumann entropy of the state ρ, we are assuming
that Eve receives the state ρE|x with probability p(x) and, thus,
ρE =
∑
x p(x) ρE|x. To calculate χ (A; E) we must distinguish
HD-QKD from PNR-QKD, since in the first case the useful
information is contained only in one single quadrature (say
X), while in PNR-QKD it is contained in both X and Y
(the difference appears essentially in the reconciliation stage).
According to the protocol, in the case of HD-QKD Eve receives
the mixed state (the information about the random variable y
is lost)
ρE|x =
∫
R
N0,2 (y) |
√
1 − η(x + iy)〉〈
√
1 − η(x + iy)| dy
(13)
with probability N0,2 (x) [25]. By contrast, in PNR-QKD
Alice is sending information stored in both X and Y , and
therefore Eve’s conditional state is now the pure state
ρE|(x,y) = |
√
1 − η(x + iy)〉〈
√
1 − η(x + iy)| (14)
and S[ρE|(x,y)] = 0, while ρE is the same as in HD-QKD.
When RR is considered, we should substitute χ (E; B ) =
S[ρE] −
∑
n,m p(n,m) S[ρE|(n,m)] to χ (A; E) into Eq. (12).
Here p(n,m) is the marginal of PXL(x, y; n,m) given in
Eq. (10), i.e., the joint distribution for obtaining n and m
number of photons at Bob’s PNR detectors and ρE|(n,m) is the
corresponding conditional state received by Eve.
The KGR for collective attacks is depicted in Fig. 5 as a
function of η in the case of HD-QKD and PNR-QKD for
DR and RR. It is clear that in the framework of collective
attacks and DR (solid lines), HD-QKD outperforms PNR-
QKD (but for very high channel transmissivity!). Nevertheless,
in the presence of RR we still find that PNR-QKD beats
the scheme based on homodyne detection, though, as the
channel transmissivity decreases, they exhibit almost the same
performance.
FIG. 5. KGRI (coll) as a function of channel transmissivity η in
the presence of collective attacks for HD-QKD (green) or PNR-QKD
(red). We set β = 2 and 2 = 2. Now PNR-QKD beats HD-QKD
for any value of η only in the case of RR, whereas if we use DR,
PNR-QKD turns out to be the best strategy only for high values of
the channel transmissivity.
IV. CONCLUDING REMARKS
In conclusion, we have shown that PNR detectors may
be profitably employed to design a hybrid quantum key
distribution protocol using coherent states. If we are restricted
to individual attacks, when we exploit the full information
at the output to implement PNR-QKD, the dependence of
the two-dimensional discrete output variable on both the
input quadratures provides enhancement of the secret KGR
compared to HD-QKD, both for DR and RR. In the presence
of collective attacks and RR the PNR-QKD still outperforms
the homodyne-based strategy, though as the transmission of
the channel decreases, the performance is almost the same as
that of the HD-QKD. If we consider DR, the strategy based on
PNR turns out to be the best choice only for very high values
of the channel transmissivity. This is due to the conditional
state received by Eve: in the case of HD-QKD it is a mixed
state (the information about one quadrature is lost), whereas
for PNR-QKD she receives pure states, having access to both
the orthogonal quadratures, and thus leading to a clear increase
of the overall gained information.
If we focus on the regimes where using PNR leads to greater
I , we can also note that PNR-QKD requires a lower value of
η with respect to HD-QKD in order to obtain a given value of
the KGR. This can be indeed an advantage, also considering
that the state-of-the-art technology exploiting PNR detectors
cannot achieve the overall quantum efficiency of homodyne
detectors. In practice, homodyne setups may easily exhibit
quantum efficiencies larger than 0.8, whereas customary PNR
detectors are about 0.5 [14] or less. Nevertheless, there exist
photon-number-resolving techniques based on transition-edge
sensors which allow one to obtain a much higher efficiency,
∼0.9 or higher [26,27].
Further investigation is expected upon the design of a
scheme for distilling a secret key after having run the
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protocol and the investigation of performances for PNR-
detector-based protocols involving not just simple homo-
dyne detection at the receiver but also heterodyne detec-
tion [5–7,21,22]. In this view, our results pave the way
for further developments in this promising field of quantum
technology.
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